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Over to you Mr Johnson 
 
Timothy WHITTON 
 
 
Résumé 
 
In 2008, Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson defeated Ken Livingstone 
in the third elections to become the executive mayor of London. 
Livingstone had held this post for the previous eight years during which 
he had implemented his personal brand of municipal politics and given 
London back the voice that the city had lost in 1986 when Mrs Thatcher 
abolished the Greater London Council. It was thought that he would 
have no credible opponent in 2008 but observers underestimated the 
potential of “Boris” who was able to oppose “Ken” on his own turf, 
that of personalising the election almost ad nauseam to the extent that his 
slogan “Time for a Change” rang particularly true. 
This article recalls the main characteristics of Ken Livingstone’s rise to 
fame before focussing on the 2008 transition chosen by the London 
electorate. 
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Introduction 
In the run-up to the 2008 elections for the post of mayor of 
London the general feeling was that Ken Livingstone would have no 
credible challenger. Indeed, in 2000 he had become London’s first 
executive mayor and this election victory was repeated four years later. 
Back in the early days, when Livingstone was leader of the Greater 
London Council (GLC), he had been quite prepared to take on central 
government when it came to promoting the choices that he felt were 
first and foremost in the interests of the capital city. This belligerent 
attitude goes a long way to explain why in 1986, Mrs Thatcher’s 
government went to such lengths in order to get rid of the Metropolitan 
Councils whose municipal socialism did not tally with the Conservatives’ 
dominant ideology. 
The abolition of the GLC in 1986 left the thirty-two London 
boroughs to grapple with pan London projects but despite increased 
government funding, somehow the voice of the capital – the only one in 
Europe not to have a central authority – had been extinguished. Still 
sitting on the benches in Parliament reserved for Her Majesty’s 
Opposition, the Labour Party very timidly suggested that a central 
authority should be restored in order to reinforce London’s ability to 
maintain its status as an international capital city. But Labour had to be 
particularly cautious given that the more radical left-wing fringe of the 
party, symbolised by “red” Ken and his friends at the GLC1, had been 
very instrumental in bringing about the demise of the party during the 
1980s. It goes without saying that the modernisers were prepared to go 
to great lengths in order to stifle any reference to this troubled period of 
their party’s recent past. According to them, if London was to have a 
new central authority it would be small, efficient and audible, very 
“new” Labour and a far cry from the labyrinthine organisation of the 
GLC based in County Hall. 
With this in mind and after their fourth successive defeat in 1992, 
Labour produced several papers devoted to the organisation of London 
but it was only during the run up to the 1997 General Election that they 
came down firmly on the side of creating a mayor and an assembly for 
London should this be approved by Londoners through a referendum. 
As it happened, their electoral victory left no doubt as to the support 
the electorate was prepared to give them and true to their manifesto 
pledges, a referendum was organised producing an endorsement of 
plans to create the Greater London Authority. 
                                                 
1 Known as the “loony left”. 
The main political parties had quickly realised the political leverage 
that the position of mayor could provide and New Labour strove to 
make sure that one of the party loyal should be selected to be its 
candidate. Ken Livingstone’s efforts to be given a chance to compete 
were constantly thwarted and following an internal selection process 
that somewhat unfairly forced him out of the race, he declared his 
independent candidature. For this act of defiance, Livingstone was 
excluded from the party for five years but despite this handicap, he was 
popular enough to romp to victory in the first mayoral election on May 
4th 2000. 
Livingstone’s spent a good deal of his first mandate opposing 
central government about the latter’s plans to use a Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) to renovate the London underground but this period 
also witnessed the introduction of the congestion charge in central 
London. Following the success of this policy, New Labour came to 
terms with the fact that its only real option was to bring Livingstone 
back into the fold to fight the next election under its banner. 
Livingstone’s exclusion was duly lifted and although with a slimmer 
margin, he won the second election to become London’s mayor in 2004. 
The GLA and central government had by this time buried the 
hatchet of fratricide war and never was collaboration between the two 
more obvious than when London was given the Olympic Games in July 
2005. Because of his highly praised leadership following the 7/7 
bombings Livingstone reached a new height of popularity and it seemed 
as if nothing stood between him and a third term of office. Yet there 
were signs that he was outwearing his welcome at the GLA and this 
weakness was adroitly exploited by Boris Johnson when he began 
mounting his challenge. If at first no one believed that Johnson would 
be a credible opponent, attitudes changed when “Boris” played the 
personality card that had become the hallmark of municipal politics in 
London especially after “Ken” had been in charge for so long. 
Power in London changed hands in the 2008 election and it would 
be hard to pinpoint the precise reason for this swing all the more so as 
in the days leading up to the election, opinion polls were only separating 
candidates by a hair’s breadth. Livingstone lost the election as much as 
Johnson won it both emphasising each other’s weaknesses: Boris had 
little experience of municipal politics let alone running such a huge 
organisation as the GLA and his ideas for public transport sometimes 
appeared to be more the result of hopeful guesswork then well thought 
through policies. Even so, his campaign team was particularly efficient 
in canvassing the outer Conservative dominated boroughs where they 
knew that votes for their candidate were to be gleaned. On the other 
hand in the run up to the 2008 election, Livingstone had to deal with a 
prolonged period of accusations about cronyism, sleaze, and underhand 
dealings at the London Development Agency to the extent that many of 
his opponents referred to the capital as a “kenocracy”.  
Yet perhaps the most convincing argument peddled by Johnson 
neatly summed up in his campaign slogan was “Time for a Change”. 
After eight years of Livingstone, Londoners were prepared to give 
someone else a chance especially given that “our Ken”, as many of them 
fondly referred to their mayor, had somewhat lost the knack of 
defending the everyday interests of London in his traditionally 
independent way. 
 
Early days: from opposition to abolition 
When Livingstone became leader of the GLC in May 1981 after 
wresting power2 from the far more moderate “natural” candidate, 
Andrew McIntosh, the British press leapt on the Labour Party for not 
being able to keep its troops on a tight rein: London was now in the 
hands of “red” Ken and his cronies. When she heard the news, Mrs 
Thatcher was in Scotland and during the Scottish Conservative Party 
conference declared that “the GLC will impose upon this nation a 
tyranny that the peoples of Eastern Europe yearn to cast aside”3. 
Livingstone’s “tyranny” took the form of policy choices that would 
constantly put the GLC at odds with the government. Fares Fair was 
perhaps the best example whereby the GLC slashed the price of public 
transport in the capital very nearly plunging the GLC into bankruptcy4. 
It was Livingstone’s personal brand of municipal socialism that was 
to really get the government’s goat especially given that he excelled in 
the art of provocation. Shortly after becoming leader of the GLC he 
refused an invitation to the wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana 
and a few months later expressed compassion with the IRA in the wake 
of its bombing campaigns. “Red” Ken was branded the most odious 
                                                 
2
 A detailed account of this “caucus” vote is given in chapter 3, ‘Phew what a caucus’, 
in Carvel, J., Turn Again Livingstone, Profile Books, 1999, p. 60-86. 
3
 Speech by Mrs Thatcher, 8 May 1981 at Perth City Hall. 
4 For Livingstone’s account of this episode see Livingstone, K., If Voting Changed 
Anything They’d Abolish It, Collins, 1987, p. 2008-2017. 
man in Britain by The Sun5 and his antics at the GLC came across as 
being unacceptable. This attitude was compounded by his tendency to 
tamper with the sort of international politics that had very little to do 
with the remit of London government6/7. 
Yet despite this hostility, Livingstone could rely on a groundswell of 
support from people who felt that the GLC was the only decent 
opposition left in Britain to the economic juggernaut of the Thatcher 
governments. The erection of huge billboards on the roof of County 
Hall showing the unemployment figures in London was a 
demonstration of the protest role that the GLC could play at that time. 
Indeed, the first years after 1979 had witnessed a steep rise in the 
number of jobless nationwide which could easily be imputed to the 
political and economic choices made by the government. Official 
political opposition was nonetheless deemed feeble given the disarray 
within the Labour Party and in this context, at least the GLC was seen 
to be publicly voicing some form of disagreement with central 
government. 
Ken Livingstone quickly became a thorn in the government’s side 
to the extent that following her second election victory in 1983, Mrs 
Thatcher decided to abolish the metropolitan councils and above all the 
GLC. This policy choice was enshrined in the White Paper Streamlining 
the Cities in which the government explained that this centralised layer of 
local government had become superfluous and in London for example, 
the borough councils would easily be able to take on the responsibilities 
of the GLC. The truth of the matter was that Livingstone represented 
everything that Mrs Thatcher loathed about local politics and she was 
quite prepared to do away with the GLC in order to stamp out 
municipal socialism. But the GLC had become a well oiled protest 
machine finely tuned in to the defence of lost causes and right up until 
abolition on April 31st 1986, fought every inch of the way. Just as the 
roof of County Hall had been used to underline the rate of 
unemployment in London, the façade, a stone’s throw across the 
                                                 
5 13th October 1981. 
6 Councillors were often amazed at the time spent debating the Palestinian question, 
the miners’ strike and the Falklands to quote but three examples. People were so 
fascinated by this approach to municipal politics that starting in 1983, the Times 
regularly devoted a column to life at County Hall. See also Whitehouse, W., The GOC – 
the Inside Story, James Lester Publishers, 2000. 
7 The internationalisation of London government was reinforced during Livingstone’s 
two terms of office as mayor of London. Johnson has returned to a more traditional 
approach to the international aspect of London governance. 
Thames from the House of Commons, was ideal to unfurl large banners 
sporting messages stating the GLC’s anti-abolition case. The whole 
show quickly used the slogan Say No to No Say and while every attempt 
was made to inform public opinion of how the GLC ran London, 
perhaps the greatest victory achieved was the Lords’ refusal to approve 
the government’s paving bill given its undemocratic nature8. 
Livingstone emerged from this campaign a folk hero, the David 
who had taken on the Goliath of the government and although he had 
not succeeded, this reputation was to stand him in good stead to 
become the first mayor of London in 2000. Andrew Hosken reports 
that soon after this first victory, Livingstone thanked Patrick Jenkin, the 
Minister in charge of the Paving Bill used to abolish the GLC, for giving 
him the reputation that made this victory possible9. 
 
Citizen Ken 
Perhaps one of the more obscure chapters of Livingstone’s political 
life was his nomination to become the Labour Party’s candidate in the 
constituency of Brent East10. In essence, as soon as abolition became 
unavoidable, Livingstone needed a bolthole, a place out in the 
wilderness of life after the GLC where he would be able to continue his 
political career. It must be said that Livingstone had few friends in 
Parliament, either in or out of the Labour Party, especially among the 
latter’s modernisers who were desperately trying to make the party 
electable once again. The fourth defeat in 1992, albeit something of a 
surprise, bolstered their belief that the only way back to power was a 
fundamental renovation of the Party’s political credibility. This meant 
that when calls were made to create a new central authority in London 
the emerging “new” Labour Party trod very carefully knowing full well 
that any reference to the “loony” GLC days could endanger attempts to 
modernise. If London were to be given back the voice that it had lost, 
the new authority would speak the language of the modern Labour 
Party. 
                                                 
8 The government had planned to do away with the 1985 municipal elections one year 
prior to abolition and replace elected councillors with appointed officials but the Lords 
prevented them from doing this by prevaricating sufficiently to upset the parliamentary 
calendar. For a detailed account see Hosken, A., Ken. The Ups and Downs of Ken 
Livingstone, Arcadia Books, 2008, p. 202-206. The Lords were thanked for their 
contribution with yet another banner fluttering from the roof of County Hall. 
9 Ibidem p. 206. 
10 This is related in Carvel, J., op.cit., p. 142-149 & p. 208-210. 
While the Conservatives continued to be particularly generous with 
London in an attempt to prove that the decision to abolish the GLC 
had been legitimate, various papers11 were published by Labour stating 
the case for creating a new central authority in the capital. In the run up 
to the 1997 election it was decided that in the event of victory, a 
referendum would be organised to let Londoners decide12. Had New 
Labour foreseen the extent of its historic victory, then it would certainly 
have dispensed with this tactic but true to its word, and in the wake of 
the referenda in Scotland and Wales, Londoners were called to the ballot 
on May 7th 1998 in order to give the government the green light or not. 
Although turnout was low – 34.6% - the “yes” vote was victorious and 
New Labour felt that having taken so long to come back to government, 
the least it could do was to respect its election pledges. 
The main political parties had predicted the result and had started 
seeking a suitable candidate to become mayor of London for quite some 
time. The general feeling was that this post would be the ideal relay for a 
party’s political project in the capital city and that candidates would need 
to be aware of the political responsibility involved. Having first 
criticised13 the idea of having an executive mayor in London, Ken 
Livingstone quickly realised that this position was tailor-made for him in 
all but one main aspect: if he were to represent the Labour party and be 
its candidate in the mayoral election, he would have to toe the party line. 
This he found difficult to do especially when the government issued its 
plans to use a Public Private Partnership (PPP) in order to renovate the 
London underground. Even though this had been written into the 
party’s manifesto, Livingstone now felt that it was not the right strategy 
for London or Londoners. His own idea was to encourage Londoners 
to subscribe to a public bond system in order to retain control of their 
transport system. 
After a good deal of equivocation14, Livingstone was finally allowed 
to compete in the primaries but the system used meant that political 
                                                 
11 Working Together for London (1994), A Choice for England (1996), A Voice for London 
(1996). 
12 For full information concerning the referendum see Whitton, T., « La pratique 
référendaire et la Mairie de Londres », in, ‘La pratique référendaire dans les îles 
britanniques’,  Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, Hors série n°2, été 2009, pp. 67-
84. 
13 Hansard, 6 June 1997, col. 717. 
14 See Whitton, T., « ‘Nightmayor at City Hall’, les coulisses d’une investiture, d’une 
élection et d’une réélection à Londres », in, Susan TROUVE, directrice de publication, 
Les Coulisses du pouvoir, Observatoire de la Société Britannique, n°6, juin 2008, p. 197-
225. 
organisations affiliated to the Labour Party could use the block vote 
thus giving them far greater influence than individual members. In view 
of this, the party’s apparatchik, Frank Dobson, had a distinct advantage 
over the other candidates and in February 2000, duly emerged victorious 
from the primaries. Livingstone, outraged at such skulduggery, declared 
his independent candidature and was excluded from the party for five 
years. He took this in his stride and launched his campaign aboard a 
purple bus which enabled the “cheeky chappy” to link up with everyday 
Londoners, those who were keen on the idea of their city being run by a 
maverick rather than a run-of-the-mill politician kowtowing to his 
party15. “Our” Ken, as many Londoners would fondly refer to him, 
fitted the bill perfectly, was well versed in municipal politics and knew 
how to harbour the groundswell of support that he could muster given 
people’s disappointment with national politics. Nevertheless, the 
campaign was difficult and even bitter at times given that he had no 
party machine to help him, with New Labour doing their utmost to 
emphasise how difficult it would be for London if the mayor were at 
loggerheads with central government. The media went to town about 
Livingstone’s past and his tendency to defend obscure causes but 
despite this onslaught fuelled by the May 1st protests in the capital, on 
May 4th, 2000 he became London’s first executive mayor, albeit on 
second preference votes16. Livingstone’s first words on hearing the 
election result will go down in history: “As I was saying before I was 
rudely interrupted 14 years ago...”. Meanwhile New Labour’s candidate 
had come a sorry third, well behind the Conservative candidate, Steven 
Norris. London was Ken’s. 
 
Congestion charging to a second victory 
Livingstone almost immediately locked horns with the government 
over transport policy and more precisely the PPP that was to be used to 
renovate the underground. While expressing his hostility to the PPP, 
Livingstone also announced his plans to introduce a congestion charge 
in central London, one of his flagship policies that had been clearly put 
forward in his manifesto17. New Labour was in two minds about such a 
                                                                                                                  
 
15 Livingstone’s campaign slogans were Vote4Ken, Ken4London and Hoot4Ken, all of 
which figured in huge letters on his purple bus. 
16 The whole story is told in D’Arcy M., & Maclean R., Nightmare. The Race to Become 
London’s Mayor, Politico, 2000. 
17 Ken4London, “Ken Livingstone’s Manifesto for London”. 
policy: on the one hand it tallied perfectly with their quest for 
innovation but on the other, if successful, it would mean that 
Livingstone, the renegade, would have the capital firmly in his grasp. 
The first attempt to readmit Livingstone failed, incidentally the day that 
City Hall was officially inaugurated by the Queen. But with the 
congestion charge looming large, Livingstone’s political future was at 
stake especially since his attempts to derail the PPP had run out of 
steam. True to his word, the mayor forged ahead and despite problems 
in the underground which could have made him postpone the 
congestion charge, it came into force as planned on February 17th, 2003. 
In a relatively short time the charge was hailed as a success and New 
Labour had to come to terms with the fact that Livingstone was set to 
be re-elected mayor of London in 2004. By hook or by crook his five 
year sanction had to be shortened to enable him to fight this election for 
the party that he had belonged to since coming into politics. 
This step was not easy given that New Labour wanted to avoid 
giving the impression that it was going back on its word. The eighteen 
years spent sitting on the benches of Her Majesty’s Opposition and four 
successive General Elections lost meant that despite its recent successes, 
the Labour Party was still keen to protect its political credibility. Added 
to this was the fact that the party had already chosen its official 
candidate, Nicky Gavron, to compete in the next mayoral elections. 
Also, some of the major figures of the Labour Party - Gordon Brown in 
particular - were extremely hostile to the readmission of Livingstone 
both for reasons linked to what they considered to be his treachery and 
their personal dislike of both the man and the politician behind the 
mayor of London. Despite this, ever the opportunist and realpolitik 
aficionado18, Blair made it clear to Gavron that she should step aside 
and ordered his lieutenants to bring Livingstone back “into the fold”19. 
The Prime Minister was perfectly aware of the fact that the opinion 
polls were giving Livingstone victorious in the next mayoral election 
whatever his status and whichever party he should stand for especially since 
he had been declared the most influential person in British public 
                                                 
18 In his memoirs entitled  A Journey, Tony Blair says that in the 2000 election “Frank 
[Dobson] had about as much chance of beating Ken Livingstone [...] as Steptoe and 
Son’s horse had of winning the Grand National”, p. 264. Blair goes on to express a 
certain admiration for Livingstone.  Only one single sentence is devoted to the 2004 
mayoral election. 
19 “Blair wants Livingstone back in fold. Mayor set to rejoin Labour Party”, The 
Guardian, November 10th, 2003. 
services20. But Labour’s NEC rapidly found the necessary loophole: by 
asking Livingstone to fulfil a mission for the party – ie to fight the next 
mayoral election in its name – reintegration became automatic. Rumour 
has it that Gordon Brown found it hard to contain his fury and that 
John Prescott held his nose when the NEC voted but all the same, 
Livingstone’s exclusion ended on January 7th, 2004. 
Thus began Livingstone’s connivance with the Labour Party which 
inevitably weakened his stance as an independent politician. A few days 
after reintegration, despite his announcing that both Thatcher and Blair 
had tried to crush him and both had failed, the reasons for Livingstone 
accepting to accomplish a “mission” for the Labour Party became 
clearer: on January 16th, London officially presented its request to host 
the 2012 Olympic Games21. Secondly, CrossRail22, a project to construct 
a new, partly underground railway across London was approved by the 
government as was, a short while later, the mayor’s plans to build a new 
toll bridge across the Thames. There was some dismay therefore at the 
thought that Livingstone could have sold his soul to the devil of New 
Labour and accepted too docilely to become “Blair’s mayor”. 
Yet, Livingstone knew only too well that despite this climate of 
cooperation, the electorate was in the mood to punish New Labour 
given the overall political situation and of course the turn that the war in 
Irak had taken. In light of this, New Labour kept a very low profile 
during the campaign leading up to the elections in June23 and at times it 
seemed as if the incumbent mayor was striving to revert back to an “old 
Ken” style of politics by being deliberately provocative and 
swashbuckling24. To a certain extent this attitude paid dividends if the 
overall results of the elections are taken into account: whereas New 
Labour came a real cropper losing hundreds of seats nationwide, 
Livingstone held his head high in London and albeit with a slimmer 
margin, was re-elected mayor on June 11th25. The main quarrels with 
central government now seemed to be a thing of the past, the PPP was 
in full swing to renovate the underground and the congestion charge 
                                                 
20 “Livingstone judged most influential figure in Britain’s public services”, The 
Guardian, September 10, 2003. 
21 It goes without saying that no Olympic committee would have given the games to a 
town where local and central government are seen to be at loggerheads. 
22 http://www.crossrail.co.uk/ 
23 Both GLA and local elections were to be held on the same day. 
24 On various occasions, Livingstone made some startling headline statements about 
the Saudi Royal Family, Georges Bush and Ariel Sharon. 
25 Labour also lost two seats on the London assembly. 
had become part of everyday life. To all intents and purposes, the GLA 
and New Labour could envisage the Olympic calendar with some degree 
of serenity. Somewhat tragically though, the Olympic bid was going to 
allow Livingstone to reach a new peak of popularity before falling foul 
of the exercise of power.  
 
Olympic and international Livingstone 
In the wake of his election victory, Livingstone quickly hit the 
headlines in the first of a series of provocative stances that were going 
to dog him right up to the 2008 elections. Several of these stand out as 
being instrumental in his downfall since they emphasise the drift that the 
mayor’s governance of London had undertaken. Indeed, Johnson’s 
campaign team adroitly exploited the tendency for Livingstone to 
consider the capital city as a “Kenocracy” whereby the mayor was seen 
to be dictating the rules that the GLA had to abide by. One of these was 
that the rights of minorities and groups should be a priority and the 
mayor’s opponents were only too pleased to point out that these 
decisions were all too often taken to the detriment of the majority. This 
goes a long way to explain why during his campaign, Johnson insisted so 
consistently on his intention to revamp the old much loved Routemaster 
buses: they had been gradually replaced by the new “bendy” buses, 
which Londoners – and particularly cyclists – disliked, apparently to 
accommodate the necessary ramps for wheelchair users. Given the 
frequency of ramp use, Londoners were inclined to believe that once 
again, their mayor had responded vigorously to a minority need and that 
the majority could only grin and bear it26. 
In a first instance, Livingstone invited the muslim preacher, Sheikh 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi to City Hall. Because of his views on certain issues 
such as women and homosexuality, Al-Qaradawi was considered by 
many people as an extremist and as such, was banned from entering the 
United States. Secondly, in February 2005, a few – drunken – words to 
an Evening Standard journalist had Livingstone branded an anti-Semite. 
All that was requested of the mayor was to offer a few words of apology 
but in the style that had become the hallmark of his action, Livingstone 
refused, preferring to spend considerable amounts of public money on 
court cases that dragged out over a two year period, the main aim of 
                                                 
26 Little do Londoners possibly know that the GLA was obeying a European directive 
whereby all public transport has to be accessible to the handicapped by January 1st, 
2017. 
which was to determine whether the mayor was guilty or not of 
inappropriate behaviour. 
Despite this accumulation of faux pas, undoubtedly the high point 
of this second mandate came on July 6th, 2005 when at 12.47pm, Jacques 
Rogge, the president of the Olympic Committee, announced that the 
2012 Games would be organised by London. Tony Blair, whose party 
had won its third successive General Election two months earlier, 
rejoiced in Scotland where he was heading the G8 meeting and in 
Singapore, Livingstone hugged David Beckham, a photo which gave rise 
to many wry smiles: “red” Ken conniving with such an icon of 
capitalism. Yet there joy was short lived for a few hours later London 
was struck by a series of bomb attacks which left more than fifty people 
dead and many hundreds wounded. A week later, Livingstone gave one 
of his most poignant speeches when in Trafalgar Square he told the 
terrorists that they would never force Londoners to turn on one another 
“like animals” and that London drew considerable strength from being 
one of the most tolerant and multicultural cities in the world27. 
Livingstone quickly became the spearhead of a national rejection of 
these acts of terrorism and for a short while, even his opponents left 
him in peace. At this point it seemed indeed as if Livingstone was set to 
become the long term mayor of London. 
Yet the mayor’s tendency to speak his mind was soon to destroy 
this new found aura when after the shooting of Jean Charles de 
Menezes, a Brazilian electrician mistaken for a terrorist on the 
underground, he explained that in certain circumstances, and notably in 
Palestine, certain oppressed people are forced to commit acts of 
terrorism. This justification for terrorist attacks in the wake of the 
bombings in London raised Londoners’ shackles and the mayor’s new 
found popularity was quickly transformed into a trough of opprobrium. 
But Livingstone seemed to be at his best in the face of adversity and 
quite untroubled even when the placing of the statue of a naked, 
pregnant, handicapped woman on the forth plinth in Trafalgar Square 
sparked off a series of sarcastic comments most of which were centred 
on his weakness for promoting minority groups’ interests28. And a short 
while later, with the court case concerning the Jewish journalist still in 
the offing, Livingstone publicly insulted the Reuben brothers after an 
altercation concerning the Olympic building site in Stratford in which 
the two men were playing a leading role. Livingstone was again accused 
                                                 
27 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BSIBPsbL9c 
28 The statue was called Alison Lapper Pregnant. 
of anti-Semitism but unable to hold his tongue, only three weeks later he 
accused the American ambassador in London of being a “chiselling little 
crook” for not paying the congestion charge on the fleet of embassy 
vehicles. In April 2006 during a visit to the Olympic site in Beijing, the 
mayor declared that Great Britain would do well to take a close look at 
her own record with Amnesty International before criticising China’s 
record on human rights. 
But it was perhaps the “brooms for oil” deal that really convinced 
Londoners that Livingstone had become divorced from the reality of his 
mission as mayor of London and that a certain degree of arrogance had 
crept into his attitude vis-à-vis the GLA. In May 2006, the Venezuelan 
president, Hugo Chavez, was invited to London and after a few days of 
pomp and ceremony during which the two accomplices revelled in anti-
capitalist discourse, an agreement was signed whereby Chavez was to 
sell cheap oil to London – how it was to be stocked and where remain a 
mystery – in exchange for GLA expertise on urban management29. The 
Conservative members of the GLA were aghast at this use of public 
funds to promote – according to them - transatlantic socialist causes and 
underlined the free rein that the mayor of London’s had in running the 
city30. This aspect of Livingstone’s governance was emphasised once 
again when in February 2007, the congestion charge was extended to the 
west despite consultation that had shown major hostility towards such a 
project. Despite the fact that Livingstone seemed unchallengeable, the 
time was perhaps ripe for change in order to bring the mayor back into 
check and show him that there were limits to his scope of action 
especially concerning the international role of the GLA. All that 
remained for his opponents was to find a suitable candidate capable of 
opposing him. 
 
“Boris” versus “Ken” 
Boris Johnson was by no means the “natural” candidate of the 
Conservative Party which had approached a string of people potentially 
capable of winning the contest, only to be turned down on each 
occasion31. In July 2007, one year before the elections, Boris Johnson’s 
                                                 
29 “Hugo Chavez divides world opinion. But who is he and what is he up to in 
Britain?” The Independent, May 13th, 2006. 
30 “Ken’s Tricks”, The Daily Telegraph, May 16th, 2006. 
31 Greg Dyke, former director of the BBC, Lord Coe, head of London’s Olympic 
Games’ bid, Sir Digby-Jones, former director of the Confederation of British Industry, 
name was put forward and although at first he refused, given his safe 
parliamentary seat in Henley-on-Thames, he finally accepted having 
understood the opportunity he would then have to be a front scene 
politician within his party. David Cameron had just reshuffled the 
Shadow Cabinet and Johnson had not been given any new political 
responsibilities. Above all, Johnson was well equipped to challenge 
Livingstone on his own turf where both were natural media performers, 
candid, articulate, funny with the ability to be irresistibly self-
deprecating. This was evidently going to lead to a highly personalised 
campaign where the electorate would be inclined to choose between 
different personalities rather than different manifestos32. This was all the 
more true given that no candidate could make any major innovative 
claim – such as the congestion charge – especially given that since July 
2005, all eyes were riveted on the Olympic Games. Even though the 
budget seemed to have spiralled out of all control and was a far cry from 
the £9 billion originally touted, work was definitely under way and the 
whole Olympic machine lumbering towards the 2012 deadline. Mayoral 
candidates’ propositions were therefore going to be mainly cosmetic, 
each one promising better transport, more policemen, cleaner air and 
more affordable housing to list the main points underlined in the 
manifestos. Livingstone had the advantage of being able to be judged on 
what he had already achieved and was using his mayor’s prerogative to 
announce his plan to introduce a new bike hire scheme along the lines 
of the Parisian Velib. The other candidates had to rely on their ability to 
persuade the electorate that they would carry this legacy forward. 
Livingstone quickly understood the personality battle that was 
going to take place but magnanimously stated that he would concentrate 
on policies rather than people. Meanwhile his campaign team combed 
through reams of material written by Johnson in search of items that 
might contradict his claim to be in tune with London governance. Soon 
the mud was flying between the two camps and at this game, Johnson 
was likely to lose not being accustomed to the grubby fray of municipal 
politics. Added to this weakness was the fact that his campaign lacked 
lustre which explains why the conservative headquarters took the 
decision to draft in the Australian political strategist, Lynton Crosby 
who had masterminded four successive victories for John Howard. This 
recruitment was to pay huge dividends insofar as Crosby was able to 
                                                                                                                  
Lord Stevens former police commissioner, Nick Boles, head of the think tank “Policy 
Exchange” and Nick Ferrari, well-known radio host. 
32 As it happened, as we shall later, the personalisation of the campaign was not the 
only clinching factor in Johnson’s victory. 
pinpoint where Johnson could garner large numbers of votes – 
essentially in the outer Conservative dominated boroughs - and oversee 
efficient canvassing there by persuading voters that they were playing an 
active part in getting one of their own kind elected to the post of mayor 
of London. 
Seemingly undaunted by the election looming, late in 2007 
Livingstone oversaw the opening of two “Kenbassies” in Delhi and 
Mumbai33. But while he led a delegation of 81 people around India, Lee 
Jasper, Livingstone’s close friend and advisor on race issues at the GLA, 
was becoming the focus for investigation for the misuse of public funds. 
He had become the latest target of the Evening Standard journalist, 
Andrew Gilligan who was ratcheting up his relentless campaign to 
unseat Livingstone with whom the newspaper had been at odds for the 
past few years34. Livingstone did all he could to defend Jasper, but at this 
point in the campaign, any scandal about cronyism and wasting public 
funds was going to be damaging, possibly far more than rising crime and 
teenage murders which were becoming frequent in the capital. To this 
end, the Channel Four documentary Dispatches, broadcast in January, 
went to great lengths to underline the weaknesses in Livingstone’s 
administration based on a six month study by journalists from New 
Statesman. This documentary was followed by accusations that some 
GLA staff had worked full time on Livingstone’s campaign in 2004 and 
when another employee, Rosemary Emodi, was caught lying about a 
free trip to Africa, her immediate resignation did little to quell the 
outcry. Yet it was probably the suspension and then resignation of 
Jasper that did the most damage especially when in his follow-up article, 
Andrew Gilligan underlined the other five police investigations that 
were currently underway into alleged misuse of GLA funds. David 
Cameron even questioned Gordon Brown over impropriety at the GLA 
during Prime Minister’s Question Time35. 
The last two months before election day were devoted to 
permanent meetings, visits, hustings and other activities during which 
the candidates laboriously hammered out their plans for London while 
                                                 
33 The Express, November 20th, 2011. 
34 This antagonism is said to be due to a personal conflict between Livingstone and the 
chief editor of the Standard, Veronica Wadley. In the Independent, February 9th 2008, 
Andrew Grice explains just how important the Evening Standard’s campaign was 
proving to be. See “Back Ken to hang on to his £11bn budget”. 
35 Hansard, March 5th, 2008, col. 1740. 
challenging their opponents36. The third candidate, the Liberal 
Democrat, Brian Paddick, nurtured the hope that the weary electorate 
might turn to him quite simply as an alternative to the two main 
candidates and that second preference voting would enable him to win. 
But Livingstone had already clinched a deal with the Greens over 
second preference votes, Johnson had kept quiet and during BBC’s 
Newsnight hosted by Jeremy Paxman, Paddick quite openly declared that 
in his opinion, his main opponents were equally bad for London37. 
 Meanwhile opinion polls showed that while the Conservative Party 
was increasing its lead over Labour nationally speaking, in London, 
Johnson and Livingstone were neck and neck. It was too late to hope 
that the more technical details concerning the recurrent themes of crime 
or transport would have more than a superficial impact on the outcome 
whereas the Evening Standard caused substantial damage - yet again - for 
Livingstone with its front-page photo of Yusuf al-Qaradawi alongside a 
suicide bomber. At this stage and with polls narrowing the gap even 
further just a week ahead of election day, this sort of publicity could 
clinch victory for Johnson. In the same vein, an editorial in The Sun on 
April 22nd, “London Calling”, called on the electorate to vote for 
Johnson, praising his straightforward plans to finally change the capital 
while underlining the incumbent’s “stale” and “exhausted” campaign 
and “crackpot” schemes. Livingstone hit back by declaring that 
Londoners should not entrust their city’s colossal budget to someone as 
inexperienced as “Joker” Johnson. The last few days were peppered 
with claims and counterclaims and it must be said that during this final 
stage, Livingstone actually seemed to be feeling the strain referring – 
albeit fleetingly - to the possibility of his losing38. 
 
Conclusion 
On May 1st, 2008 Boris Johnson was elected mayor of London 
receiving 1,043,761 votes to Livingstone’s 893,877 on the first count, 
Paddick coming in third with 236,685. After second preference votes 
had been integrated, Johnson’s score was 1,168,738 (53,2%) and 
Livingstone’s 1,028,977 (46,8%). Participation was up on the 2004 
                                                 
36 This period is described in great but somewhat fastidious detail in Edwards, G., & 
Isaby, J., Boris v. Ken. How Boris Johnson Won London, Politico’s, 2008, p.110-195. 
37 It was broadcast on April 6th. 
38 The Evening Standard, “ ‘People may toy with the idea of voting for Boris but when it 
comes to it they will find they can’t do it’; Mayor elections”. One day to go. April 30th, 
2008. 
election and doubtlessly the confrontation between the two main rivals 
had attracted many people to the ballot boxes. Johnson’s victory speech 
was gracious, Livingstone’s tearful.  
This result can be explained in a variety of ways but despite the 
highly personalised side of the election epitomised by the “Boris versus 
Ken” duel, the Conservatives had undoubtedly run a far superior 
campaign. Lynton Crosby had concentrated the party’s efforts on the 
outer boroughs39 where he knew the party had a good chance of 
garnering votes thanks to traditional political allegiance rather than 
sympathy or empathy vis-à-vis the main contenders. In turn, this 
strategy portrayed Livingstone as essentially a “zone-one” mayor, as the 
following “first preference” map highlights: 
 
Source: http://www.vote-2007.co.uk/index.php?topic=1586.870 
(consulted 15/01/2011) 
This said, there is no denying the impact of the Evening Standard’s 
relentless onslaught on Livingstone especially during the last six months 
                                                 
39 This strategy was called “doughnut tactics” whereby efforts are concentrated on the 
outer ring leaving a hole in the middle.  
when the GLA became embroiled in sleaze. Above all, the allegations of 
corruption, especially those surrounding the Jasper affair, enabled 
Livingstone’s opponents to exploit what they deemed was the mayor’s 
overall amateur approach to the financial management of London. 
Given the colossal budget involved, the incumbent’s long-term political 
credibility was bound to suffer. The cost of the Olympic Games was a 
case in point with the budget literally spiralling out of control. Indeed, in 
the run up to the 2008 election, on several occasions Livingstone 
brushed aside queries about the Olympic budget stating that the 
government would foot the bill come what may and that he was quite 
prepared to put up with three weeks of sport to harness sufficient 
funding for the renovation of a vast area in the east of London. 
However pragmatic this may sound, it was not at all in keeping with the 
Olympic spirit that Londoners were supposed to be imbued with.  
In another area, Johnson was able to reap some benefit from one of 
his initial weaknesses, namely his gross miscalculation concerning buses. 
Indeed, given the pride of place of the traditional Routemaster in 
Londoners’ hearts, Johnson’s hostility towards the “bendy buses” struck 
a sympathetic cord with many electors who were totally oblivious to the 
more technical details. By stating that he wanted to retain bus 
conductors as well, Johnson gave the impression that he would listen 
more to Londoners and refrain from imposing choices made by the 
GLA and the executive mayor, one of the main criticisms levelled at 
Livingstone. By declaring that he would severely reduce the international 
dimension of the GLA by immediately closing the “Kenbassies”, 
Johnson also sent a clear signal to Londoners namely that if elected, he 
would be their mayor and cease strutting the international stage. 
London has definitely changed since the first mayoral election in 
2000 the oyster card and the congestion card acting as daily reminders 
of what mayor Livingstone achieved during his two mandates. 
Livingstone will also go down in the history of London as having 
promoted the sort of multiculturalism which makes the city an 
international capital. Yet for many, defending the cause of the hundreds 
of minorities which make up the rich patchwork of London’s 
population had become the mayor’s hallmark, his personal ideology and 
crusade, to the detriment of the majority. 
When the idea of creating an executive mayor was first touted in 
1998, Livingstone had found the idea ludicrous but having come round 
to the idea, he stated that the mayoralty should be limited to two 
mandates so as to avoid the corruption and dogmatism that inevitably 
sneaks into this level of governance. This statement backfired on him 
and made Boris Johnson’s simple campaign slogan ring even truer: 
“Time for a Change”. 
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